Welcome Patrick Eddington, and Host Tim Shorrock, author of, Spies for Hire

[As a courtesy to our guests, please keep comments to the book.  Please take other conversations to a previous thread. - bev]

Long Strange Journey: An Intelligence Memoir

Tim Shorrock, Host:

Patrick G. Eddington is a rarity in Washington these days: an intelligence officer with a conscience. His book, Long Strange Journey, is a riveting account of how he became a whistle-blower at the CIA and exposed how his own agency and the Department of Defense for years covered up the truth about “Gulf War Syndrome” – the exposure of U.S. troops in Iraq to chemical weapons used by Saddam Hussein during the First Gulf War. It also provided a detailed account of what it means to be an imagery analyst in the US intelligence community and how imagery is (and should be) used on battlefields to assist US soldiers and commanders.

In his introduction, Patrick writes:

Long Strange Journey is a first-person account of the high-tech, space-based side of the intelligence business. Although President Carter first revealed the existence of our imagery spy satellites nearly 30 years ago, no analyst who has used those systems has written a book on the topic and got it past CIA censors until now. My tenure at the CIA spanned the transition from the Cold War to the new era of American interventionism in the Persian Gulf and the Balkans. The book draws upon not only my direct experience reporting on these events for senior government policy makers, but also upon thousands of pages of previously classified documents secured through litigation I pursued during the last decade.

Among other things, readers of Long Strange Journey learn:

* That the CIA’s much-publicized failure to accurately characterize Iraq’s chemical warfare capabilities actually goes back decades and spans three wars.

* How Saddam Hussein’s forces trained for the invasion of Kuwait, how that activity was missed or misinterpreted by the American intelligence community in the year before the attack, and how U.S. intelligence sharing with Iraq may have given Saddam the confidence that he could redeploy forces off his border with his arch enemy Iran and send additional Iraqi forces south to occupy Kuwait.

* How, from July 20, 1990 onward, the first Bush administration ignored compelling evidence of Saddam’s intent to invade Kuwait, despite the overwhelming satellite imagery-derived reporting of the Iraqi military build up on the Iraq-Kuwait border.

* That the federal government deliberately attempted to suppress evidence of chemical exposures among Desert Storm veterans.

* How the CIA’s post-Desert Storm tilt towards deepening its support to Pentagon operations compromised the Agency’s independence, and the role the CIA played in supporting Pentagon operations in Haiti and the Balkans.

I’m pleased and proud to be hosting Patrick’s appearance on FDL’s Book Salon today. I’m especially interested in his take on imagery intelligence because it was a major topic of my book SPIES FOR HIRE on the vast privatization that has taken place in the US intelligence community. Plus his story is one of courage and hope – something we badly need in these times. Welcome, Patrick!

To get the conversation rolling, let me start with this: A lot of us have been riveted by the media reports from the Japanese earthquake and the unfolding nuclear power plant crisis at Fukushima. What would our classified imagery be able to tell us about the Japanese quake that we couldn’t learn from commercial satellites and media outlets like CNN?

And either before or after you answer that, please describe for us what an imagery analyst does for US intelligence, based on your experience at the CIA.

147 Responses to “FDL Book Salon Welcomes Patrick Eddington, Long Strange Journey: An Intelligence Memoir”

BevW March 12th, 2011 at 1:56 pm

Patrick, Welcome to the Lake.

Tim, Welcome back to the Lake and for Hosting today’s Book Salon.

bmaz March 12th, 2011 at 2:01 pm

Hello Pat, welcome; and than you Tim for hosting!

Patrick Eddington March 12th, 2011 at 2:02 pm

Thanks, Tim–and a huge thanks to Bev Wright and the entire FDL family for inviting me to be here today. Let me start by saying that my remarks today reflect my views alone.

dakine01 March 12th, 2011 at 2:02 pm

Good afternoon Patrick and Tim and welcome to FDL this afternoon

Patrick, I have not had an opportunity to read your book so forgive me if you answer this in there, but was there anything specific about your book that allowed it to get past the CIA censors? Or did they just decide that awareness of the Imagery programs was out there and time to allow someone to tell the story?

(Note: I worked for a number of years for Booz, Allen & Hamilton in Rome, NY within the “Intelligence Community.” Part of that included proposals for taking existing technology, including imagery, and creating “dual use” and commercial applications.)

Patrick Eddington March 12th, 2011 at 2:06 pm
In response to dakine01 @ 4

There is a very cumbersome process–like running a gauntlet–that courts require one to go through….it’s called the pre-publication review process.

Tim Shorrock March 12th, 2011 at 2:07 pm

Hi, this is Tim Shorrock. Welcome Patrick and FDL readers!

Patrick Eddington March 12th, 2011 at 2:07 pm
In response to BevW @ 1

Let me quickly answer Tim’s questions. Look at the world from above, whether your using satellite imagery or video from a drone. Google Earth would have been classified TOP SECRET/RUFF SENSITIVE 20 years ago, had it existed. It’s all about being able to distinguish trucks from cars, tanks from armored personnel carriers, etc. Softcopy imagery exploitation was still a very new thing when I joined the National Photographic Interpretation Center in early 1988. A whole generation of imagery analysts have now worked almost exclusively in the digital world. If you asked them “What’s a light table?”, they wouldn’t have a clue.

In Desert Storm, “unmanned aerial vehicles” (UAV’s) were in their infancy–relatively short-ranged and with limited capabilities. Today, with a platform like Global Hawk–assuming of course that it’s actually working–you have a UAV with global reach and host of sensors that can operate in the visible, infrared, radar, and other wavelengths. It’s worth noting that last year was the first year in history that the Air Force actually bought more unmanned than manned systems.

Tim Shorrock March 12th, 2011 at 2:08 pm

Did you see my first question above, Patrick?

Tim Shorrock March 12th, 2011 at 2:10 pm

So please explain what an imagery analyst actually does, Patrick.

Patrick Eddington March 12th, 2011 at 2:10 pm
In response to Tim Shorrock @ 8

Yes, and let me answer that one as well. Clearly, I can’t discuss the capabilities of currently classified systems. That said, they are pretty amazing…but so too are the commercial “birds” flown by DigitalGlobe and GeoEye. They give you the ability to conduct damage assessments of infrastructure, help find evacuation/rescue routes, etc.

Tim Shorrock March 12th, 2011 at 2:12 pm

And your job, once you receive this imagery, is what?

Patrick Eddington March 12th, 2011 at 2:12 pm

It’s all about identifying man-made objects in the midst of natural made ones…picking out tanks from trees, etc. It’s also about being able to distinguish a T-72 tank from a T-55 tank–the one type is more capable (and thus more of a threat to US forces) than another. A lot of training is involved–classroom and OJT.

Tim Shorrock March 12th, 2011 at 2:13 pm

Has the creation of the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) – which folded together your old agency, NPIC, with the imagery offices at the Pentagon – helped in the collection and analysis of imagery, in your estimation?

bmaz March 12th, 2011 at 2:13 pm

Pat, have you followed at all the trials and tribulations of Scott Bloch in the DC District Court? The guy who used to be in charge of fielding whistleblowers and getting to the bottom of their issues for the Bush Administration is facing the big house for squelching and hiding the whistleblowing attempts of his own staff and attorneys in the Office of Special Counsel. Have any thoughts on that case?

Patrick Eddington March 12th, 2011 at 2:13 pm

Writing reports about what one sees…reports that are then circulated throughout the intelligence and policymaking communities.

Tim Shorrock March 12th, 2011 at 2:14 pm

And FYI, here’s the website for the NGA – https://www1.nga.mil/Pages/Default.aspx

Patrick Eddington March 12th, 2011 at 2:14 pm
In response to bmaz @ 14

That could be an entire discussion of its own! :)

I must confess that I’ve not had the time to follow the case lately, but to say that his tenure was controversial would be the understatement of the year….

BevW March 12th, 2011 at 2:15 pm

From Jim White:
Pat, I apologize again for not being online for the Salon.

It’s hard to fathom just how dramatically things have changed in the twenty years since the early part of your book. It seemed that your description of the fall of the Berlin Wall on page 52 captured that change from the era when analyses of 24 hour old photos were state of the art to when live analysis became the mode of operation:

Someone in NPIC–to this day I still don’t know who–actually put in for overhead satellite collection of the Wall. When the “happy snap” came in on November 10, the pristine overhead shot was dutifully displayed at the IEG morning meeting. CNN and virtually every other news organization in the world had reported on the fall of the Wall live, in real time. . .yet here we were, wasting countless thousands of dollars for a “top secret” still photo of something that had already been reported around the planet. It was a classic example of how thoughtlessly some in government could waste taxpayer money.

I would imagine that there now must be image analysts who continue the traditional sorts of analysis you were trained in for locations/movements of troops and their associated equipment and analysis of ground installations for changes to them. But there must also be a new breed of analyst for real time work, and it seems to me that this brings with it an opportunity for real issues to arise between intelligence sorts and tactical military sorts. Are you able to address whether CIA supplies intelligence specialists to such operations today or whether DoD handles all aspects of these real time decisions that rely on imagery?

Patrick Eddington March 12th, 2011 at 2:15 pm
In response to Tim Shorrock @ 13

I think it was a disaster, not the least because it gave DoD total control over national imaging systems–just as NSA gained control of all signals intelligence systems. That’s dangerous in a democracy. When the CIA was created, it had its own dedicated imagery and signals intelligence capability to complement its human spies. Now it only has the human spy component; the other collection capabilities were taken over by either NGA or NSA. Pretty tough for CIA to offer unbiased, independent analysis when it has to rely on DoD to supply it with the imagery and signals intelligence cuts for that analysis.

There’s also the issue of how much the military has penetrated/cooped the CIA itself through the Agency’s creation of the Office of Military Affairs (headed by a two-star general) and the fact that many CIA directors have been active duty or retired four-star officers. All of that undermines the CIA’s ability to provide genuinely independent analysis.

Patrick Eddington March 12th, 2011 at 2:17 pm
In response to BevW @ 18

DoD, through NGA, pretty much controls the entire USG imagery show…very scary in my view, for some of the reasons I cited above.

Gitcheegumee March 12th, 2011 at 2:17 pm

Good afternoon gentleman. A real privilege to be able to participate with such informed persons.

Some time back, the LA Times did a piece called Secret Agent Insurance Man. It dealt with WWII use of aerial reconnaisance of military targets that was used in conjunction with info from insurance companies located in Europe ,and other countries-including the Far East,like AIG….(which was not called AIG,then,btw.)

Now AIG did and ACE did/does insure a great deal of the government required insurance on war time contractors and other governmental types.(Hank Greenberg’s son is Chairman of ACE,btw.)

Do you think that the refusal to admit GWS was related to claims?

Tim Shorrock March 12th, 2011 at 2:17 pm

Wow, that’s a very different answer than you get from NGA officials and their contractors. So you basically see it as watering down the intelligence side and becoming too close to the DoD side?

Patrick Eddington March 12th, 2011 at 2:18 pm
In response to Gitcheegumee @ 21

With respect to having to compensate veterans for exposures to chemical agents yes–the VA would be paying billions more in claims if all of the ones submitted by ill Desert Storm veterans were actually honored.

Patrick Eddington March 12th, 2011 at 2:19 pm
In response to Tim Shorrock @ 22

Without question.

eCAHNomics March 12th, 2011 at 2:19 pm

Welcome Patrick,

Have you checked out your review on amazon? There is only 1, but out of 5 stars, he gave you a 6+.

Tim Shorrock March 12th, 2011 at 2:19 pm

Let’s get to the story you tell in your book. In your view, why did the CIA and the DoD cover up the facts – and many classified reports they had – on Gulf War Syndrome and Saddam’s use of chemical weapons? You mention a World War II incident in Italy, when the Germans bombed a US ship carrying chemical munitions and Eisenhower later wrote that nothing had happened. Why this historical refusal to acknowledge chemical and biological weapons, even when used by the other side?

Patrick Eddington March 12th, 2011 at 2:22 pm
In response to Tim Shorrock @ 26

In part, it’s bureaucratic. People in CIA and DoD put their names on post-war reports that stated–categorically–that no weapons were forward deployed and no troops were exposed. Both claims were false.

There’s also the issue of having to admit that DoD failed to take seriously the thousands of chemical alarms and detections that occurred. Like then-Congressman Bernie Sanders said at the hearing I testified at in December 1996, “If the alarms were all false, have we asked for our money back?” Obviously, DoD didn’t–which was another clue that the alarms/detections were, in many cases, valid.

Tim Shorrock March 12th, 2011 at 2:23 pm

Next, I’d like to ask if you can comment a bit about the politics behind the deployment of secret satellites and other assets used in imagery, such as UAVs. How are decisions to place satellites actually made?

Patrick Eddington March 12th, 2011 at 2:24 pm

Yeah, I probably owe Steele a dinner or something. :)

Actually, if you look at some of the “Editorial Comments”, you see several from the folks who endorsed the book…including two former Church Committee counsels. I was flattered, to say the least. :)

Tim Shorrock March 12th, 2011 at 2:25 pm

Great to get such praise from the Church Committee folks.

Patrick Eddington March 12th, 2011 at 2:25 pm
In response to Tim Shorrock @ 28

In my day, it was handled by an interagency body called COMIREX (Committee on Imagery Exploitation Requirements). Targets for collection would be nominated by the various intelligence agencies, and COMIREX would play referee. Today, the process has become substantially more decentralized, with the commands (CENTCOM, EUCOM, etc.) essentially owning assets like Predators/Reapers and running their own collection operations.

eCAHNomics March 12th, 2011 at 2:26 pm

I’ve read about a dozen books on the spook business and look forward to reading yours.

So far, the best has been The Second Oldest Profession by Knightly. What I particularly liked about it was not its history of MI6 and CIA, but the general lessons it pointed out.

Namely, the spy biz is fatally flawed owing to its secrecy.

Some of the specifics you point out in the introduction. Let me name a few more: no competition (even is with multiple agencies, they’re all secret) to keep up honesty, no amount of oversight is possible (will just keep secrets from overseers), every failure is an excuse for bigger budget (if we only had more money/people we would surely have gotten it right), and they have only one customer, so of course they are going to look for what that customer wants to find, find it and report it.

That’s just a few implications of secrecy. Sounds like you would be in agreement with the general principle.

Would you like to flesh out this point?

Patrick Eddington March 12th, 2011 at 2:26 pm

Loch Johnson and Burt Wides are legends…I am in awe of them.

Tim Shorrock March 12th, 2011 at 2:26 pm

So if an imagery analyst suddenly saw something they believed was critical to national security, they’d report it up the chain to get approval for movement of the satellites or other assets? Is there an appeal process if the request is turned down?

eCAHNomics March 12th, 2011 at 2:28 pm

Or maybe Steele is a pen name you use? *grinning*

Patrick Eddington March 12th, 2011 at 2:29 pm
In response to eCAHNomics @ 32

To a degree, but I will say that when I was in and you actually had NPIC, OIA (CIA’s own imagery shop), and DIA/DX, there was a very health competition that sometimes bordered on outright hostility between the organizations. I felt it was very healthy.

If you want to read an outstanding book about such competition in the WW II signals intelligence field, check out “And I Was There” by Rear Admiral Edwin T. Layton. Long story short: competition among SIGINT units in the Navy paved the way for the Coral Sea and Midway victories in 1942.

BevW March 12th, 2011 at 2:29 pm

Jim White:
Expanding on my first question, I found it very significant that you noted the predominantly white and mostly male make-up of the newly recruited image analysts in your training class when you first started. Sadly, it appears to me that this situation has not improved yet. Isn’t it likely that a complete lack of cultural awareness plays a huge role in the mis-targeting of drones when they hit things like wedding parties? Similarly, doesn’t it seem unlikely that when the US helicopters that recently gunned down nine Afghan boys as young as 9 that there could have been Afghans either in the helicopters or somewhere at a base viewing video from the chopper? Wouldn’t an Afghan with experience in the region have a perspective on what foraging for firewood would look like from the air as opposed to insurgents looking for cover?

Patrick Eddington March 12th, 2011 at 2:31 pm
In response to Tim Shorrock @ 34

Most of the time the collection was driven by we analysts; COMIREX would only veto something if there was a higher priority issue of concern to senior IC leaders or policy people at the White House, DoD, or State.

Tim Shorrock March 12th, 2011 at 2:32 pm

Here’a s follow up and a bit of a loaded question. You spent a lot of time studying imagery of the old Soviet Union and its republics, as well as Bosnia during the Serbian War. Yet in the 1980s, there were terrible atrocities committed by death squad governnments in Central America that we were ostensibly allied with. Imagery of, say, El Salvador and Guatemala, could have alerted us to those atrocities, just as they alerted the CIA to what the Serbs were doing in Bosnia. But of course the satellites weren’t over those countries. Isn’t that a problem – I mean, human rights should apply to everyone, not just people we “like,” right?

Patrick Eddington March 12th, 2011 at 2:33 pm
In response to BevW @ 37

You’ve put your finger on a critical point: there are very real limits to what imagery–satellite or drone video–can do for you in a counterinsurgency environment. The ultimate thing you need is absolutely rock-solid HUMINT on targets…and of course we don’t have too many folks working in the IC who group in the Swat Valley….

Patrick Eddington March 12th, 2011 at 2:34 pm
In response to Tim Shorrock @ 39

Could you explain that to President Obama? :)

eCAHNomics March 12th, 2011 at 2:34 pm

To pick a recent example, I was all alone in figuring out that there were no WMDs in Iraq before the invasion. Alone in the sense that I was not yet connected to an online community like FDL, and my friends were working (I was involuntarily retired) so didn’t have the time I had to read.

I thought I must be nuts. Why could I see it so plainly when the vaunted intel community was so flummoxed. (I was also much more naive at the time.)

But then it became clear. Not only had W et al est their own channel, std intel community wouldn’t speak truth to power bc that’s where their paychecks come from.

SanderO March 12th, 2011 at 2:35 pm

I am not as concerned with the CIA information gathering as much as using this information for operations. Obviously the two are intertwined.

Could you elaborate on this?

Patrick Eddington March 12th, 2011 at 2:36 pm
In response to eCAHNomics @ 42

That is another common bureaucratic malady that invariably costs us lives…and the lives of others.

Tim Shorrock March 12th, 2011 at 2:36 pm

This was an earlier question from dakine01
Patrick, I have not had an opportunity to read your book so forgive me if you answer this in there, but was there anything specific about your book that allowed it to get past the CIA censors? Or did they just decide that awareness of the Imagery programs was out there and time to allow someone to tell the story?

(Note: I worked for a number of years for Booz, Allen & Hamilton in Rome, NY within the “Intelligence Community.” Part of that included proposals for taking existing technology, including imagery, and creating “dual use” and commercial applications.)
replyReply

Patrick Eddington March 12th, 2011 at 2:38 pm

In part, it was my willingness to sue them if they tried to excise material that was 1) never classified or 2) could not possibly be construed to compromise sources and methods. I sued the hell out of them over my first book and their attempts to–get this–reclassify data that had been in the public domain for a year.

eCAHNomics March 12th, 2011 at 2:38 pm

As you can tell by my screen name, I was an economist, so I have a healthy respect for competition.

Even in the Iraq fiasco, comp bet State Dept intel & CIA was what told me that the AL tubes were not used in centrifuges, as State Dept analysts had the more convincing evidence.
t
So yes, competition can make a big diff, but not big enough.

If you had to assign a % that CIA got it right vs. wrong, what would it be?

Gitcheegumee March 12th, 2011 at 2:39 pm

Mr. Eddington, are you familar with the saga of Raymond Davis ,who is now incarcerated in Pakistan?

Care to share any insight on that,and do you think there was high tech imagery involved in that situation?

Thanks in advance.

Tim Shorrock March 12th, 2011 at 2:39 pm

OK, that question was from someone who used to work at Booz Allen Hamilton. Which leads me to a key question. The NGA, as I disclosed in my book, has a staff that is 50 percent government and 50 percent contractors. And about 70 percent of the intelligence budget goes to private sectors. Can you comment on the growth of contracting, how and why expanded, and your own experiences with contractors while you were at the CIA?

Patrick Eddington March 12th, 2011 at 2:42 pm
In response to eCAHNomics @ 47

On the Iraq WMD question? They blew it entirely. If you’re asking for a broader assessment of what the CIA has got right/wrong over the years, that would be a book in itself. The major ones though would be 1) fall of Soviet Union (#fail), Arabs would destroy Israel in 1948 war (#fail), and 3) that Saddam would not swallow Kuwait (#fail).

Patrick Eddington March 12th, 2011 at 2:43 pm
In response to Gitcheegumee @ 48

Yes, I’ve been following the Davis case. My hunch is that he was involved in the drone targeting program (from the ground) but whether he has an imagery background himself, I don’t know….far more likely US Special Forces.

eCAHNomics March 12th, 2011 at 2:44 pm

Did you ever work in, or have much contact with, CIA operations? That is the bunch of rogue operators who seem to do nothing more than going around the globe created HUGE problem for locals & U.S.

In the 13 times CIA was significant element in Overthrow (book with that title) in the last century, they all turned out badly for the population except (arguably) Puerto Rico. And didn’t benefit U.S. much either, esp when you consider blowback.

Agree? Disagree? Comments?

dakine01 March 12th, 2011 at 2:45 pm
In response to Tim Shorrock @ 49

I do have to say that at least the contract I worked under (I left BAH at the end of ’94) was not in anyway operational but was technical support and systems engineering. If BAH has picked up operational contracts it was long after I left there (though there were a lot of folks with alphabet soup clearances)

Tim Shorrock March 12th, 2011 at 2:45 pm

On drones – in your experience, how is targeting enhanced by use of NSA signals intelligence? While you were at CIA did you often combine imagery with signals intel for use by warfighters and in reports and finished intel?

Patrick Eddington March 12th, 2011 at 2:46 pm

When I started in 1988, the only contractors we had were the IT folks. By the time I left in 1996, they were starting to hire imagery analysts back as contractors on a limited basis, usually for specialized skills (nuclear test monitoring experience, etc.). Today, you have legions of former intelligence analysts-turned-contractors working across all 16 agencies to one extent or another. In my view, the process has gone way too far; it discourages accountability because it’s much easier to fire a contractor (or pressure them to shut up) than it is a government employee.

eCAHNomics March 12th, 2011 at 2:46 pm

So here’s my specific Q re Iraq/Kuwait/Saudi Arabia. What info did you have when you wrote your book that Weiner didn’t have?

Phoenix Woman March 12th, 2011 at 2:46 pm

Hello and welcome, Patrick! Thanks for coming.

Would you care to address the role played by the “PNAC Platoon” (Doug Feith and the other “Vulcans”) in pushing or “stovepiping” unvetted information if it told them what they wanted to hear concerning Iraq?

Jeff Kaye March 12th, 2011 at 2:48 pm

Hi Tim, Patrick, thanks so much for being here.

This dovetails with Tim’s question at 39. Patrick, I was wondering if you were familiar with the Satellite Sentinel Project, using Google Map technology to report on the Sudan conflict and human rights abuses. Do you see more of these kinds of projects in the future? Is military/NSA/CIA surveillance going to have to compete more and more with what private surveillance can produce? Do you think it’s a lot of money spent when the government may not even act on this information. SSP is already reporting villages burned in the Abyei region of Sudan, etc., but I see nothing in the press on this. It seems like a high-tech version of all the revelations about torture, but nothing being done. (And yes, before someone jumps in to remark, this is the George Clooney project.)

Tim Shorrock March 12th, 2011 at 2:48 pm

That pressure could also be applied to get intelligence with a desired outcome too, as Cheney did as VP. But with contractors, they always want to please their agency master so they can get the next contract. Isn’t that a problem with outsourced intel too?

Patrick Eddington March 12th, 2011 at 2:49 pm
In response to Tim Shorrock @ 54

Yes, and our routine use of HUMINT and SIGINT in our products was a constant source of friction with our “all source” counterparts at CIA headquarters. NPIC management had to tow the line to a certain degree since NPIC was, nominally, a CIA component, but at the analytical level we always strove to work in all available information into our reports so that our customers understood the context for our largely (but not wholly) imagery-based judgments.

Jeff Kaye March 12th, 2011 at 2:49 pm
In response to Tim Shorrock @ 49

Tim, an aside, I’m reading David Corn’s old book, “Blonde Ghost”, and he documents that over half the CIA staff working in Korea during the Cold War were contractors. So is this an issue of long standing? Do you know how many contractors were used in Vietnam, say? Perhaps Patrick also has some thoughts on that.

Tim Shorrock March 12th, 2011 at 2:50 pm

Why was that a source of friction? Wouldn’t they want the signals stuff to augment their intel?

Patrick Eddington March 12th, 2011 at 2:50 pm
In response to eCAHNomics @ 56

The imagery cables that I and my colleagues wrote at the time. Tim of course wasn’t on the inside, so it’s understandable that he didn’t have all the facts. But it’s also true he never sought me out during the writing of his book. Had he done so, I would’ve gladly shared my experience with him.

eCAHNomics March 12th, 2011 at 2:51 pm
In response to Tim Shorrock @ 59

I’ve often remarked that if you’ve graduated from kindergarten, you don’t need any further instruction to tell you all you need to know about pleasing your boss. He doesn’t need to “tell” you what he wants to hear in so many words. It’s obvious without a word being said.

Unavoidable when you have a monopsony (single buyer or customer).

Jeff Kaye March 12th, 2011 at 2:52 pm

I’m embarrassed to say I have not obtained your book yet, Patrick. Do you cover or know much about the burgeoning issue of mini-drones, which DARPA has been working on all these years. They are said to be near operational status, including one the size of a hummingbird.

Gitcheegumee March 12th, 2011 at 2:52 pm

Thank you for your reply.

Perhaps I didn’t make myself clear-which is quite often,btw.

What I was trying to ask is do you think his movements were being tracked, all the while ,by the “Spy in the Sky” and were there perhaps even communication between himself and said “spy”?

Patrick Eddington March 12th, 2011 at 2:52 pm
In response to Phoenix Woman @ 57

Feith’s operation was rogue, had non-existent peer-review, and was clearly policy-outcome driven–everything good intelligence analysis and reporting is not.

Tim Shorrock March 12th, 2011 at 2:53 pm
In response to Jeff Kaye @ 61

Interesting – I’ve been re-reading that too (for the Cuba stuff). Of course Vietnam & IndoChina were heavily contracted, but mostly in the area of logistics – setting up the infrastructure, ferrying troops around, etc. The use of contractors to actually analyze intelligence and function as CIA assets came much later. But the Vietnam era is an important piece in the whole history of outsourcing.

Patrick Eddington March 12th, 2011 at 2:54 pm
In response to Tim Shorrock @ 62

They felt we were “poaching” on their turf (i.e., all source intel). It was a moronic attitude to take, but SOVA (that’s Office of Soviet Analysis) analysts were kind of legendary for their arrogance…ironic given how much they got wrong.

BevW March 12th, 2011 at 2:54 pm

Exmaples? Could you expand?

Patrick Eddington March 12th, 2011 at 2:56 pm
In response to Gitcheegumee @ 66

Apologies…I see your point. Any tracking would likely have been done via some form of GPS; imagery satellites are in orbits and operate in such a way that they can only take a limited number of pictures over a given area at a time. UAV-driven visual surveillance is another matter, assuming the operators are able to keep track of who is a friend vs. who is a foe….a dicey proposition as others have observed this afternoon.

Patrick Eddington March 12th, 2011 at 2:58 pm
In response to Jeff Kaye @ 65

I know they are working on exactly that kind of technology…something that literally looks like a hummingbird. I’ve seen video of it. What happens, though, when the smart Al Qaeda terrorist with an engineering degree manages to snag one? Not sure they’ve thought through all of the potential “blow back” scenarios….

Tim Shorrock March 12th, 2011 at 2:59 pm

Getting back to my question on Central America, and Jeff’s on Sudan (#58), how do you think US imagery assets should be used to track human rights abuse, refugee flows, etc, even in countries where we’re not at war or where we don’t have “strategic” interests?

eCAHNomics March 12th, 2011 at 3:00 pm

In ref to your comment in the introduction about getting CIA permission, the only CIA book I’ve read by an ex-CIAer who specifically rejected CIA authorization was Stockwell’s In Search of Enemies (Angola ops). Stockwell argues that since the CIA did not honor its side of its bargain (contract?) with him, he had no obligation to honor his side of the deal.

I gather you had no such issues bc you took a strong stand, but would you like to comment on what CIA would do if an ex-employee just published w/o permission, and how Stockwell got away with it?

Patrick Eddington March 12th, 2011 at 3:01 pm
In response to BevW @ 70

Sure. In the book, I talk about one incident that occurred when I was tracking the expanding civil unrest in the Soviet Union in 1988-89. I was using various unclassified sources to help me plot additional collection points/targets for the “birds” to take pictures of, and one of my SOVA counterparts insisted on using other classified (but at the time, inaccurate) sources–it got pretty nasty/heated. I won the argument and got the coverage but I’m sure that person will not be buying the book. :)

Tim Shorrock March 12th, 2011 at 3:01 pm

The last part of your book is a riveting account of how you went back and forth between CIA and Capitol Hill trying to unearth the story of Gulf War Syndrome, and how both CIA and DoD tried to shut you up and keep the story from getting beyond congressional investigators. Can you summarize some of what you learned about fighting the bureaucracy like this? You went through holy hell to find the truth on the chemical weapons used.

eCAHNomics March 12th, 2011 at 3:02 pm
In response to Tim Shorrock @ 73

Don’t you think the U.S. will not be very interested in tracking other countries’ human rights abuses, now that so many of the U.S.’s have been laid bare for all the world to see? Or am I still too naive?

Jeff Kaye March 12th, 2011 at 3:03 pm

Agreed, scary thought.

I’d add that much of the hidden history of U.S. intelligence since the end of WWII could almost be summarized as a history of blowback from clandestine operations and policies. Such blowback has been more harmful, IMO, than the faulty intelligence.

CTuttle March 12th, 2011 at 3:03 pm
In response to Tim Shorrock @ 49

Aloha, Tim and Pat…! Mahalo for being here…!

…staff that is 50 percent government and 50 percent contractors. And about 70 percent of the intelligence budget goes to private sectors.

The most disturbing aspect I think is that the $65 Billion Intel budget is going to the unsavoriest of the unsavory… Blackwater/Xe, Dyncorp, Triple C, ad nauseum… Which service the Neocon/NeoLib Cabal that runs our entire FP bureaucracy; Foggy Bottom, Pentagon, Langley…! It’s also extremely disturbing to see the exponential growth of ‘private contractors’ under the Cheney/Rummy/Goss etc. Stovepipe regime…! Any chance we can slew our Ship of State hard to port…?

Patrick Eddington March 12th, 2011 at 3:03 pm
In response to eCAHNomics @ 74

The Supreme Court ruled in the 1979 US vs. Snepp case that anyone who signed a secrecy agreement with the CIA had to submit their manuscript to CIA for review prior to publication. Failure to do so gives the CIA the right to take the author’s royalties. If Stockwell did as you described, I’d like to know if he was able to keep the cash, and if so, how. :)

eCAHNomics March 12th, 2011 at 3:05 pm

Tangentially related to Gulf War syndrome. A friend works in a VA hospice for VN vets. Since Shinseki took over VA, Agent Orange victims have been treated with much more care than previously. My friend’s patients & their relatives are sooo appreciative.

Patrick Eddington March 12th, 2011 at 3:06 pm
In response to Tim Shorrock @ 76

That experience–of being blown off my Congressional committee staffs responsible for overseeing the intelligence community–informs my work every day on Capitol Hill. I make it point to meet with whistleblowers. I had the honor of meeting LTC Mike Holmes this week–he’s the officer who was profiled in Rolling Stone recently for exposing General Caldwell’s PSYOP campaign against Members of Congress.

Tim Shorrock March 12th, 2011 at 3:07 pm
In response to CTuttle @ 79

Actually the bulk doesn’t go to the Blackwaters, XEs, etc, but to about 100 companies, including them but encompassing all the major defense contractors and lots of so-called Beltway Bandits that supply certain kinds of technology useful to one or more of the agencies.

Patrick Eddington March 12th, 2011 at 3:07 pm
In response to eCAHNomics @ 81

One of the highlights of my life was the nearly year-and-a-half I spent on the Government Relations team at Vietnam Veterans of America. There are some disturbing parallels between the Agent Orange fiasco and the GWS mess, for sure.

eCAHNomics March 12th, 2011 at 3:08 pm

I read the book in 02 so I don’t remember that detail.

One hypothesis was that he gave up the revenues. Another is that CIA figured publicity from trying to collected revenues would create more publicity than it wanted for such revelations in the book. Another would be that Stockwell wasn’t being truthful (though if that’s the case, he certainly fooled me).

Tim Shorrock March 12th, 2011 at 3:09 pm

Are there reforms that could be made to ease the way for whistleblowers like yourself? Also, I wanted to ask – did you ever go to the CIA IG, or did I miss that?

BevW March 12th, 2011 at 3:10 pm

Pat, did you spend a lot of time in VN? Parallels between Agent Orange and GWS, in effect on the troops or the political fallout?

john in sacramento March 12th, 2011 at 3:10 pm

Sorry haven’t read the book yet, but …

What do you think of the X-37?

eCAHNomics March 12th, 2011 at 3:12 pm

VA facility in question is in mid-Hudson region. So a month or two ago, my friend was asked to accompany a patient to his 45th West Point reunion, which she did. Shinseki was in same class, was there, and in greeting & talking to his classmate, was incredibly gracious to my friend. Shinseki seems like a really solid citizen. A really feelgood story to pass along.

CTuttle March 12th, 2011 at 3:14 pm

Have you ever talked to Dr. RJ Hillhouse, Pat…? I know Tim has before…! ;-)

Patrick Eddington March 12th, 2011 at 3:15 pm
In response to Tim Shorrock @ 86

We need an ironclad whistleblower protection statute for people who work in the national security community. Ideally, it would 1) prohibit all forms of retaliation and impose stiff fines and jail time for managers who attempt to retaliate, and 2) explicitly state that any employee of an agency engaged in national security work can make a disclosure to any Member of Congress, regardless of whether they sit on a committee of jurisdiction.

Yes, we went to the IG. Their report was a whitewash. They never demanded/examined the emails of the individuals who ultimately went after us. It was a genuine sham…but their report did contain one nugget: the CIA had identified 1.5 million documents that were potentially relevant to the GWS issue…but they weren’t going to review them. Last year, the Congress passed the FY10 Intelligence Authorization Act, which contained a declassification review provision targeted at those documents. I was very grateful that Mr. Holt took that step; the veterans have a right to know what’s in those records.

Gitcheegumee March 12th, 2011 at 3:16 pm

I Just scanned the Wikipedia entry for Agent Orange and it is both highly informative and horrific-with heartbreaking photos,btw.

Do you address the political ties between the makers of Agent Orange* and the powers that be in the Whitehouse,both then and now,in your book?
Monsanto is even more frightening,if possible,now as a corporate and environmental bully, these days.

*Agent Orange is the code name for one of the herbicides and defoliants used by the U.S. military as part of its herbicidal warfare program, Operation Ranch Hand, during the Vietnam War from 1961 to 1971.

A 50:50 mixture of 2,4,5-T and 2,4-D, it was manufactured for the U.S. Department of Defense primarily by Monsanto Corporation and Dow Chemical. The 2,4,5-T used to produce Agent Orange was later discovered to be contaminated with 2,3,7,8-Tetrachlorodibenzodioxin, an extremely toxic dioxin compound. It was given its name from the color of the orange-striped 55 US gallon (200 L) barrels in which it was shipped, and was by far the most widely used of the so-called “Rainbow Herbicides”.[1]

Tim Shorrock March 12th, 2011 at 3:16 pm

Putting aside the wisdom of the current Afghan war, which many of us disagree with fundamentally, how would you like to see the NGA and IC working to track the possibility (or real use) of chemical and bio weapons by the Taliban or Al Qaeda elements? Is there a better way for information from the battlefield to be used to inform the intel agencies about where to focus?

Patrick Eddington March 12th, 2011 at 3:18 pm
In response to BevW @ 87

No, I’ve never been to Vietnam; my brother, Kenny, is the Vietnam Vet in our family. The parallels between AO and GWS are medical and political. There was of course years of denial that AO could be causing spina bifida and the other diseases that were being seen in the children of Vietnam Veterans. There were years of denial that low-level chemical exposures could cause neurological problems in Desert Storm veterans…many of those denials continue to this day.

eCAHNomics March 12th, 2011 at 3:19 pm

That the CIA’s much-publicized failure to accurately characterize Iraq’s chemical warfare capabilitiest actually goes back decades and spans three wars.

Could you expand? CIA underestimated SH’s chem warfare capabilities?

I have also read somewhere that the U.S. specifically had chemical weapons classified as WMD after WWI bc they are so cheap & so effective & U.S. didn’t want competition for its much more expensive, less effective “conventional” weapons. Any knowledge of that? It sounds plausible but as I no longer remember where I picked up that random info, I have no idea how seriously I should regard it.

Tim Shorrock March 12th, 2011 at 3:20 pm

Your whistleblower proposal is excellent. What about the IGs? Is there a way they could be strengthened to deal with whistleblowers?

Patrick Eddington March 12th, 2011 at 3:20 pm
In response to Gitcheegumee @ 92

No, the book is focused on the period of my career at CIA (1988-96), but of course I reference the Agent Orange experience of Vietnam Veterans as an example of how are government routinely exposes troops to hazards, then refuses to pay the cost of their treatment when they come home.

Patrick Eddington March 12th, 2011 at 3:22 pm
In response to eCAHNomics @ 95

In late 1987, the CIA’s Office of Scientific and Weapons Review (OSWR) issued an assessment (available on my blog, http://www.longstrangejourney.com) that stated that Iraq would never become truly proficient in the use of chemical agents on the battlefield. That would’ve come as a surprise to the Iranians who died as a result of Iraq’s nerve agent use in its 1988 offensives. Just one example.

eCAHNomics March 12th, 2011 at 3:23 pm

Patrick, thanks so much for being here and answering all my Qs. I’m eager to read your book. Sounds like it’ll be a real page-turner for me. I must now head off to other matters.

Tim Shorrock March 12th, 2011 at 3:23 pm

Would you encourage young people to join the intelligence community today despite what you went through? If so, where would you advise them to focus their efforts? NGA? CIA?

Patrick Eddington March 12th, 2011 at 3:24 pm
In response to Tim Shorrock @ 96

I’m kind of a radical on this one. If I had my way, I’d abolish existing agency IG’s and give full subpoena power and the necessary manpower to GAO and charge them with the IG function in all executive branch agencies. The only IG in DC that I’ve seen do a half-way decent job of oversight in the last 20 years is Glenn Fine over at DoJ, and unfortunately, he’s leaving for the private sector. Don’t even get me started about the CIA IG….

Patrick Eddington March 12th, 2011 at 3:25 pm
In response to eCAHNomics @ 99

Thanks so much!

Tim Shorrock March 12th, 2011 at 3:27 pm

That’s interesting because Congress has just given GAO new oversight powers in intelligence – at least I think that passed.

BevW March 12th, 2011 at 3:27 pm

Jim White:
What is your opinion of the attempts to develop the “Gorgon Stare”, the technology which is claimed to allow a drone to assemble multiple live video feeds that would allow real-time monitoring of an entire village? My gut response is that each individual building-level feed would require multiple intelligence analysts monitoring it to have any level of confidence in the sorting out of “good guys” from “bad guys”. I realize they are trying to make the sorting computer-dependent, but I just don’t see how this technology could not also need a huge contingent of human analysts alongside it. What do you think?

Patrick Eddington March 12th, 2011 at 3:29 pm
In response to Tim Shorrock @ 93

That’s a tough one. The only way we’re ever going to get the kind of real-time, reliable intel on terrorist groups like AQ is if we can actually infiltrate them–a very, very tough proposition when they are holed-up in the Northwest Frontier Province of Pakistan. We clearly are getting some usable intel from SIGINT, less so (in my view) from IMINT. We simply do not have enough people in this country who’ve come from that region and who can thus at least have a chance of better blending in and potentially penetrating AQ…and AQ knows we’re trying.

Patrick Eddington March 12th, 2011 at 3:29 pm
In response to Tim Shorrock @ 103

Passed the House but not the Senate, last year.

CTuttle March 12th, 2011 at 3:30 pm
In response to eCAHNomics @ 89

Shinseki is an upstanding individual, he was born and raised on Kauai, and, was pursued by the Hawaii Dems to run for Guv against Lingle in her reelection bid in ’08…! Long after, Shinseki had been drummed out for his honesty in saying it would require 350,000 or more to invade Iraq…!

Remember that infamous Wolfie remark, ‘wildly off the mark’…? *gah*

Patrick Eddington March 12th, 2011 at 3:32 pm
In response to BevW @ 104

Last year, we collected in excess of 1 million hours of video footage from overseas via the drones. More than 1 million hours. Who can possibly look at all of that and make sense of it? And even if you manage to automate some or much of the process, you still need trained analysts involved in sorting out what’s usable from what isn’t. We are reaching the point–actually, we’ve probably passed it–where we’re collecting far, far more that we can intelligently exploit and use.

Tim Shorrock March 12th, 2011 at 3:33 pm

At the top of our session you said this:

Look at the world from above, whether your using satellite imagery or video from a drone. Google Earth would have been classified TOP SECRET/RUFF SENSITIVE 20 years ago, had it existed. It’s all about being able to distinguish trucks from cars, tanks from armored personnel carriers, etc.

My question – now this stuff is used by all. Doesn’t that argue against the need to classify so much of our intelligence abilities – the sources & methods that the IC seeks to protect so much? In other words, is too much of our capabilities secret?

Patrick Eddington March 12th, 2011 at 3:33 pm
In response to CTuttle @ 107

What I also remember about that episode is how not a single Senator–not one–went after Bush/Rumsfeld for spearing Shinseki like a frog. #gutless.

Tim Shorrock March 12th, 2011 at 3:36 pm

Some passages in your book are blacked out. Are these sections that you tried to keep in but lost out in your legal fights?

Patrick Eddington March 12th, 2011 at 3:36 pm
In response to Tim Shorrock @ 109

You are preaching to the choir on that one, my friend. I’ve said for years that if we lifted the legal restrictions on what companies like DigitalGlobe and GeoEye can orbit in terms of sensor resolution and eliminate the classification of electro-optical platform-derived data, you’d inject a vastly greater amount of competition into the business. Platform quality would improve and come down in price. More product would be available to federal customers. Taxpayers would save money.

Patrick Eddington March 12th, 2011 at 3:37 pm
In response to Tim Shorrock @ 111

Yes. I could potentially litigate over them, which I’ve not ruled out.

Tim Shorrock March 12th, 2011 at 3:37 pm

Look how they treated the general, Taguba, who investigated Abu Ghraib.

Tim Shorrock March 12th, 2011 at 3:38 pm

So obviously you think these cuts were not justified?

Patrick Eddington March 12th, 2011 at 3:38 pm
In response to Tim Shorrock @ 114

Indeed. And of course, we have our own “Abu Ghraib East” right here in Virginia. Manning’s confinement conditions and treatment are Guantanamo-like.

Tim Shorrock March 12th, 2011 at 3:40 pm

Getting back to how Congress works, do you think the intelligence committees have too many staffers who come out of the IC and then go back after their service? Obviously these staffers need security clearances – but wouldn’t it be better to have staffers without an institutional connection to, say, the CIA or the NGA?

Patrick Eddington March 12th, 2011 at 3:41 pm
In response to Tim Shorrock @ 115

They are absurd. If I put the text in front of a judge and showed him/her what was already in the public domain, they would (I would hope) laugh the CIA out of court. Sometimes I think the folks at the Publication Review Board (that’s what the book censor component is called) feel like they have to go after something in your book in order to justify their salaries. :)

eCAHNomics March 12th, 2011 at 3:42 pm

A small time reprieve so back for a few more.

I believe one wag (maybe it was Bamford in Shadow Factory) referred to this phenomenon vis-a-vis NSA as looking for a needle in a haystack by adding more hay.

Patrick Eddington March 12th, 2011 at 3:43 pm
In response to Tim Shorrock @ 117

One of my favorite topics. On balance, yes, I think the prior agency connections are a clear source of bias/reluctance to really take on the IC. I don’t think prior IC service should be a disqualifier–I just think that anyone who is going to serve on the staff of the House or Senate Intelligence Committees should have to convincingly demonstrate that they have a real commitment to aggressive, probing oversight…and above all an absolute commitment to ensuring the rule of law prevails.

eCAHNomics March 12th, 2011 at 3:43 pm

WRT finding terrorists by infiltrating ‘cells,’ my Q would be, if John Walker Lindh could do it, how hard could it be?

Patrick Eddington March 12th, 2011 at 3:44 pm
In response to eCAHNomics @ 119

That’s a good one! :)

Patrick Eddington March 12th, 2011 at 3:45 pm
In response to eCAHNomics @ 121

Lindh wasn’t AQ, but with the Taliban, I believe. Bin Laden and his inner circle are extremely adept at practicing operational security; it’s the reason they’re still at large almost 10 years after 9/11.

CTuttle March 12th, 2011 at 3:45 pm

…That would’ve come as a surprise to the Iranians who died as a result of Iraq’s nerve agent use in its 1988 offensives. Just one example…

The Iraki Kurds too…! Ironically, we knew they had ‘wmds’ because Raygun gave Saddam some in ’85 or so…! Hence, Tenet’s ‘Slam Dunk’…! However, that ‘smoking gun’ in a mushroom cloud was but a mere (stove)pipe dream…! 8-(

Tim Shorrock March 12th, 2011 at 3:46 pm

There’s been lots of talk lately about the lack of accountability in high places. At the Academy Awards, the director of a film on the financial crisis noted that no bank executives were ever prosecuted for acts that nearly brought the US economy down. I commented afterwards that a country that doesn’t prosecute war criminals won’t go after financial crooks. It seems we’ve set a very poor example in this country by allowing people like Dick Cheney break laws against torture and other things. How in your estimation can be have a better system of justice in national security? It was criminal (to me) how the CIA and DoD tried to stifle information on Gulf War Syndrome.

Tim Shorrock March 12th, 2011 at 3:47 pm

“Aggressive, probing oversight.” Aye, there’s the rub. If they do that, they’ll never go back to their former agencies, right?

Patrick Eddington March 12th, 2011 at 3:47 pm
In response to CTuttle @ 124

Yes, Halabja is a name that will live in infamy in the twisted annals of the history of chemical warfare. Absolutely hideous what was done to the people of that city.

PeasantParty March 12th, 2011 at 3:50 pm

Patrick,

Thank you for your responses. My question would be on the CIA currently and if you feel they often go rouge, ie: Feith as it seems some of the reports we do get are off the charts.
Did our President actually order such wild ops?

Patrick Eddington March 12th, 2011 at 3:51 pm
In response to Tim Shorrock @ 125

It would help if we had a President who did not start his administration by urging us to “look forward, not back.” Accountability–electoral and legal–is the bedrock of a functioning democracy. We do not have such a functioning democracy today. I like to tell people that while we may be living in “The United States of America” we long ago ceased living in “The Republic of the United States of America.” Accountability must be restored to our institutions–executive branch, Congress, and the judiciary. It’s up to us to do it.

CTuttle March 12th, 2011 at 3:51 pm

Jeff Goldberg sure f*cking sold us on that sordid bill of goods, eh…? 8-(

Patrick Eddington March 12th, 2011 at 3:53 pm
In response to PeasantParty @ 128

Multiple Presidents from both parties have used the CIA to overthrow governments and assassinate those the USG wanted out of the way. Weiner’s book (“Legacy of Ashes”) does a pretty good job of chronicling that part of the CIA’s history. The current Oval Office occupant has certainly not shied away from using the CIA for such missions.

BevW March 12th, 2011 at 3:54 pm

As we come to the end of this great Book Salon,

Patrick, Thank you for stopping by the Lake and spending the afternoon with us discussing your new book and the Intelligence Community.

Tim, Thank you again for returning and for Hosting this great Book Salon.

Everyone, if you would like more information:
Patrick’s website and book

Tim’s website and book

Thanks all,
Have a great evening!

PeasantParty March 12th, 2011 at 3:55 pm

Thank you for your honesty. Can we regular Americans have fear that if we protest a corrupt Goverment that the I agencies are going to disappear us?

Patrick Eddington March 12th, 2011 at 3:55 pm

My sincere thanks to all!

DWBartoo March 12th, 2011 at 3:55 pm

Fabulous book salon! Fantastic discussion.

Thank you, Patrick, Tim, thank you, all.

DW

Tim Shorrock March 12th, 2011 at 3:56 pm

Very good point about the POTUS. I too thought that was a serious mistake. It signalled that past crimes would not even be investigated. And that hurts our democracy and our republic. Other countries have tried past leaders who comitted crimes. South Korea, for example, tried and convicted two former president who, as generals, led a bloody miitary coup in 1980. The country was strengthened by that. The dissident leader who they jailed and later become president pardoned them. Yet here in America people who break the law are glorified, given time on Fox and other networks to say whatever they want.

Patrick Eddington March 12th, 2011 at 3:56 pm
In response to PeasantParty @ 133

people shouldn’t fear their governments, governments should fear their people. :)

Tim Shorrock March 12th, 2011 at 3:57 pm

Yup, our time is drawing to a close. As the host, I want to thank you, Patrick, for answering our questions and taking part in this discussion. My (Stetson) hat is off to you also for your courage in standing up for the truth and for our vets. Your story is a very moving one and I hope many, many people read your book and learn how you helped bring this issue of Gulf War Syndrome to the American public. On behalf of FDL, thanks for being here today and good luck in the future.

Patrick Eddington March 12th, 2011 at 3:57 pm
In response to Tim Shorrock @ 136

It helps if you trade arms for hostages…I hear that gets you a prime-time show. :)

PeasantParty March 12th, 2011 at 3:57 pm

Whooot! Thanks! :-)

Patrick Eddington March 12th, 2011 at 3:58 pm
In response to Tim Shorrock @ 138

My thanks again to you, Tim, and to the entire FDL community…and if you haven’t become an FDL Member, please do so!

PeasantParty March 12th, 2011 at 3:58 pm

Tim,

Great Salon! Perfect Author for the current times.

CTuttle March 12th, 2011 at 3:59 pm

Mahalo Nui Loa for writing the book and for being here today, Pat…! *g*

Another excellent FDL Book Salon…!

P.S. Pat and Tim, please don’t be strangers to the Lake…! 8-)

Tim Shorrock March 12th, 2011 at 4:00 pm

Thanks folks. Thanks Barb. Thanks Patrick. And thanks to FDL.

lsls March 12th, 2011 at 4:01 pm

OT: Another reactor has failed…8(

Gitcheegumee March 12th, 2011 at 4:03 pm

From 1977 to 1985 Rumsfeld served as Chief Executive Officer, President, and then Chairman of G. D. Searle & Company, a worldwide pharmaceutical company based in Skokie, Illinois.
During his tenure at Searle, Rumsfeld led the company’s financial turnaround, thereby earning awards as the Outstanding Chief Executive Officer in the Pharmaceutical Industry from the Wall Street Transcript (1980) and Financial World (1981).
In 1985, Searle was sold to Monsanto Company. Rumsfeld is believed to have earned around $12 million from this sale.[26]

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